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Article I
Reflections on Fisher v. University of Texas




Colleges and universities frequently receive requests and demands
from constituents to take race into account in selection of faculty,
admission of students, and financial aid. Colleges and universities seek to
promote racial and other diversity on campus and are open to ways to
increase it. Donors, alumni, faculty, and students are often unaware of the
legal framework that governs whether and how colleges and universities
can consider race in making such decisions, and college and university
administrators often seek guidance from counsel. This article aims to
speak not only to legal scholars and campus lawyers, but to the wider
campus community about the objectives that a college or university may
* Partner, Hogan Lovells US LLP; Georgetown University Law Center, J.D. 1980;
Radcliffe College, B.A. 1975. Hogan Lovells served as counsel to the American Council
on Education and other higher education associations as amici curiae in Fisher v.
University of Texas. This article expresses the views of the author, not necessarily those
of Hogan Lovells or its clients, and does not constitute legal advice. This article is an
updated version of a presentation at Penn State Law Review's Symposium on College and
the Constitution on March 24, 2016. Many thanks to Penn State Law Review for the
invitation to participate in the Symposium and to Hogan Lovells colleagues for their
assistance in preparing the presentation and this article.
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and may not seek through race-conscious means and the race-conscious
methods that a college or university may and may not use to accomplish
those goals. In light of the U.S. Supreme Court's second decision
concerning race-conscious admissions in Fisher v. University of Texas, the
time is ripe to survey this broader landscape, identify gaps, and consider
whether and to what extent Fisher 1I fills them.
I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Supreme Court's consideration for the second time of the
race-conscious admissions policy of the University of Texas at Austin (the
"University" or "UT") has come at a moment of heightened awareness of
persistent racial inequalities in our nation and calls for action by university
and other leaders in our society. Sparked by protests at the University of
Missouri, students, faculty members, and other constituents at colleges and
universities around the country have demanded that institutions increase
the racial diversity of their faculty and student bodies, including by
implementing race-conscious measures.1 The current crises magnify
proposals that colleges and universities have received over the years for
contributions from alumni and other donors to fund race-conscious
scholarships, fellowships, professorships, and other programs.
Colleges and universities are committed to fostering diversity,
including racial diversity, in their student bodies and faculty. Institutions
welcome financial support from alumni and other donors, and ideas from
all constituents, to increase diversity on campus and improve campus
climate. But students, faculty, alumni, and donors often are unaware of
the legal framework within which colleges and universities can consider
race. As a result, constituents may make proposals or demands that would
not or may not be permissible for the institution to accept.
Colleges and universities address diversity initiatives in a legally
unsettled and litigious environment. Legislatures, regulatory agencies,
and the courts have established some bright lines, but many questions
about the lawful scope of race-conscious measures remain. In seeking to
foster diversity, colleges and universities must remember the legal
limitations on race-conscious measures and seek to avoid the cost and
publicity of unnecessary legal challenges by private parties and/or
enforcement actions by government agencies. College and university
administrators typically discuss race-conscious proposals with counsel
1. See generally Leah Libresco, Here Are The Demands From Students Protesting
Racism At 51 Colleges, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Dec. 3, 2015), http://fivethirtyeight.com
/features/here-are-the-demands-from-students-protesting-racism-at-5 1 -colleges/; Our
Demands, BLACK LIBERATION COLLECTIVE (Mar. 18, 2016), http://www.blackliberation
collective.org/our-demands/ [hereinafter Our Demands].
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and aim to arrive at an approach that fosters diversity in a legally
permissible manner.
In addressing ways to reduce racial inequality on campus and in the
broader society, it is important for both colleges and universities and their
constituents to understand the nature of the constitutional right to Equal
Protection, statutory rights to equal opportunity, the objectives that
institutions may and may not seek to achieve through race-conscious
means, and the race-conscious methods that institutions may and may not
use to accomplish those goals. The Supreme Court's decision upholding
the race-conscious component of UT's admissions policy in Fisher IV may
bear on that dialogue in a variety of ways.
II. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF EQUAL PROTECTION AND
NONDISCRIMINATION LAWS
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution provides that "[n]o state shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."3 From that basic
principle the U.S. Supreme Court has derived a number of fundamental
rules. Several are particularly relevant to the Fisher case and the current
calls for greater racial equality on campus and in the wider society.
First, the Equal Protection Clause limits action by the state, not
private parties.4 The Court has also applied equal protection principles to
the federal government via the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.5 Congress and state and local governments, of course, have
enacted laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of race by private
parties, as well.6 As discussed below, the relationship between the Equal
Protection Clause and these statutes varies from law to law.
2. 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016). Reduced to seven Justices by the death of Justice
Antonin Scalia and the recusal of Justice Elena Kagan, who had been involved in the Fisher
case at he U.S. Department of Justice, the Court decided Fisher II with a 4-3 vote.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
4. The Court's state action doctrine is beyond the scope of this article. See generally
Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288 (2001); Nat'l
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459 (1999); DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty.
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989); Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian,
488 U.S. 179 (1988); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); Jackson v. Metro. Edison
Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law"); see, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200, 227 (1995); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
6. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1991) ("Section 1981") (prohibiting racial
discrimination in contracting); Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race by recipients of federal financial
assistance); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) ("Title VII")
(prohibiting racial discrimination in employment).
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Second, the Equal Protection Clause "protects persons, not groups.,,7
The legal analysis "is not dependent on the race of those burdened or
benefited by a particular classification."8 In Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke,9 a majority of the Court rejected the view that an
admissions policy preferring minorities would be justified if "there has
been some form of discrimination against the preferred minority groups
by 'society at large' and "'there is reason to believe' that the disparate
impact sought to be rectified by the program is the 'product' of such
discrimination."'
Therefore, "all 'governmental action based on race - a group
classification long recognized as in most circumstances irrelevant and
therefore prohibited - should be subjected to detailed judicial inquiry to
ensure that the personal right to equal protection of the laws has not been
infringed.""' That "detailed judicial inquiry," which the Court has come
to call "strict scrutiny," "means that such classifications are constitutional
only if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental
interests."12 The Court "appl[ies] strict scrutiny to all racial classifications
to smoke out illegitimate uses of race by assuring that government is
pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect
tool."13
HI. STRICT SCRUTINY REQUIRES LAWFUL OBJECTIVES ("COMPELLING
INTEREST") AND NARROWLY TAILORED MEANS
Campus constituents have increasingly called for race-based
countermeasures to racial injustice. The community needs to understand
better the objectives and methods that the Supreme Court has approved for
consideration of race by higher education institutions, as well as those it
has not.
7. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at
227 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); accordBakke, 438 U.S. at 289.
8. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224
(in turn quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,494 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(internal quotation marks omitted)); accord Bakke, 438 U.S. at 290 (stating that if persons
of different colors "are not accorded the same protection, . . . it is not equal").
9. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
10. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 296 n.36 (quoting id at 369 (Brennan, J., concurring in part
& dissenting in part)); see also id. at 297-98 n.37 (quoting DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S.
312, 337-40 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting)); id. at 408-21 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
& dissenting in part).
11. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)); accord Bakke, 438 U.S. at 290-91; 408-21 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part & dissenting in part).
12. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326.
13. Id. (quoting Richmond, 488 U.S. at 493 (plurality opinion) (internal quotations
and punctuation omitted)).
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A. "Compelling Interest"
Over the years litigants have argued that a number of interests rise to
the level of "compelling." The Court has rejected most of them, but
approved a few.
1. Objectives That Are Not Compelling
a. Seeking Racial Balance
To seek racial balance is not a compelling interest under current law.
Racial balance includes trying to mirror racial demographics in a given
community, such as the student body or faculty. "Preferring members of
any one group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is
discrimination for its own sake"'4 and is "patently unconstitutional."15
b. Remedying Societal Discrimination
To remedy societal discrimination is not a compelling interest under
current law. The "Court never has held that societal discrimination alone
is sufficient to justify a racial classification. ... Societal discrimination,
without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified
remedy."'6
c. Providing Role Models
To provide role models for particular races is not a compelling
interest under current law. The Court rejected this interest in the context
of a racial preference for minority teachers in layoff decisions, which was
intended to provide role models for minority students.'7  The Court
reasoned that the role model theory would allow the government o engage
in "discriminatory hiring and layoff practices long past the point required
by any legitimate remedial purpose."" The Court also worried that
"[c]arried to its logical extreme, the idea that black students are better off
with black teachers could lead to the very system the Court rejected in
Brown v. Board of Education."9
d. Preparing Professionals to Work in Underserved Minority
14. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307.
15. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330.
16. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274, 276 (1986) (plurality
opinion).
17. Id. at 275.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 276; see Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2016]
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Communities
To increase the number of professionals working in underserved,
minority communities is not a compelling interest under current law
without proof of correlation between race-conscious admissions and such
post-graduate service." In the context of medical school admissions
preferences, the Court has explained that although it may be "assumed that
in some situations a State's interest in facilitating the health care of its
citizens is sufficiently compelling," there was no proof that setting aside
seats for minority medical students would yield physicians practicing in
underserved minority communities.21 "[A]n applicant of whatever race
who has demonstrated his concern for disadvantaged minorities in the past
and who declares that practice in such a community is his primary
professional goal would be more likely to contribute to alleviation of the
medical shortage than one who is chosen entirely on the basis of race and
disadvantage."22
2. Accepted Compelling Interests
In the higher education context, the Supreme Court has so far
approved just two compelling interests: 1) overcoming the present effects
of past discrimination by the institution and 2) achieving the educational
benefits of a diverse student body.23 These interests can justify higher
education institutions' narrowly tailored use of race.
a. Remedying the Present Effects of Past Discrimination by the
Institution
To remedy the present effects of the institution's past discrimination
is a compelling interest under current law. 4 This compelling interest
encompasses, at one end of the spectrum, remedies for identified victims
of adjudicated racial discrimination, but not, at the other end, remedies for
societal discrimination.
Less clear is whether this interest is compelling absent judicial,
legislative, or administrative findings necessary to justify remedial racial
classifications.26 The Court has "stressed" that a government that seeks to
20. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 311.
23. In the K-12 context, it appears that avoiding racial isolation also qualifies as a
compelling interest. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551
U.S. 701, 792 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
24. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher 1), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2423 (2013).
25. See supra Section HI.A. 1.b.
26. See, e.g., Fisher1, 133 S. Ct. at 2417.
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use race to address "past discrimination for which it is responsible"27 must
provide a "strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action
[is] necessary.28 Colleges and universities typically do not rely on this
justification because admission of past discrimination could give rise to
other claims, and institutions have found this justification difficult to prove
in court.29
b. Seeking the Educational Benefits of a Diverse Student Body
In Fisher H the Supreme Court reaffirmed that a university has a
compelling interest in seeking the educational benefits of a diverse student
body.3" As the Court explained in Fisher I, the interest is rooted in an
institution's educational judgment that a diverse student body is
"conducive to speculation, experiment, and creation."31 Because
grounded in educational judgment and educational benefit, the compelling
interest in diversity "encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and
characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though
important element.32 An institution's "educational judgment that such
diversity is essential to its educational mission" merits some deference.33
Yet Courts will require an institution to have a "reasoned, principled
explanation for the academic decision.""
B. "Narrow Tailoring"
Even when a compelling interest exists, narrow tailoring requires the
institution to prove that it has adequately considered race-neutral
alternatives and use of race is necessary to achieve the identified
interest. As to narrow tailoring, an institution will "receive[] no
deference."35
27. Id. at 2423.
28. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500-04 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (plurality opinion)).
29. See, e.g., Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 151 (4th Cir.) (restricting
scholarships to minority students was unconstitutional because University of Maryland did
not prove that race-exclusive scholarship was narrowly tailored to overcome present effects
of past discrimination), amended on denial of reh "g, 46 F.3d 5 (4th Cir. 1994).
30. See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2210-11, 2214-15; Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
333 (2003).
31. Fisher 1, 133 S. Ct. at 2418 (citation omitted); see Fisher 1, 136 S. Ct. at 2210-
2211,2214-2215.
32. Fisher 1, 133 S. Ct. at 2418 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 315 (1978)).
33. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328; accord Fisher 1, 136 S. Ct. at 2207-08; Fisher 1, 133
S. Ct. at 2418.
34. Fisher 1, 133 S. Ct. at 2414; accord Fisher I, 136 S. Ct. at 2207-08.
35. Fisher 1, 133 S. Ct. at 2414; accord Fisher I, 136 S. Ct. at 2207-08.
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In Fisher I the Supreme Court explained that an institution must
prove, and the court must independently "verify," that "sufficient
diversity" cannot be achieved without using racial classifications.36
Institutions need not exhaust "every conceivable race neutral
alternative."37 But they must give "serious, good faith consideration" to
such alternatives.38 The question is whether such alternatives would
achieve the educational benefits of diversity "about as well" as race-
conscious means at "tolerable administrative expense."39
If a race-conscious strategy is necessary, an institution may not use
racial quotas or rigid numeric goals or assign to every minority applicant
a set number of bonus points.4 0 Rather, narrow tailoring requires that an
institution (1) give individualized consideration to all potential recipients
of the benefit (regardless of race); (2) not unduly burden members of the
non-favored group; and (3) periodically review the need to consider race,
and include a time limit on its use.41
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF FISHER II FOR PROPOSALS TO ADDRESS RACIAL
INEQUALITY
Fisher 11 did not directly address a number of the issues that bear on
race-conscious initiatives currently under discussion at campuses around
the country. Nevertheless, the decision not only may affect college and
university admissions, but could have ripple effects for other initiatives
that are intended to reduce racial inequality on campus.
A. Admissions
Student groups have recently called for quantitative representation of
minority groups in the student body as measured by the percentage of
minorities in the U.S. or in specified percentages.42 As noted above, the
Supreme Court has long disapproved such numeric absolutes in
admissions.
36. Fisher 1, 133 S. Ct. at 2420.
37. Id. (quoting Grutter 539 U.S. at 339-40).
38. Id.
39. Id. (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 280 n.6).
40. SeeFisherl, 133 S. Ct. at 2421; Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270-75 (2003).
41. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340-43; see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 551
U.S. at 733-35 (striking down race-conscious student assignment plan for lack of
consideration of race-neutral alternatives, among other easons); Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275-
76 (striking down race-conscious admissions policy at University of Michigan for lack of
individualized consideration).
42. See generally Our Demands, supra note 1.
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In Fisher II the Court first approved UT's articulation of its interest
in student body diversity as sufficiently "concrete and precise."43 UT
described its goals as destroying stereotypes and providing "'an academic
environment' that offers a 'robust exchange of ideas, exposure to differing
cultures, preparation for the challenges of an increasingly diverse
workforce, and acquisition of competencies required of future leaders."'"
The Court emphasized that UT had engaged in a year-long study,
culminating in a 39-page report, to determine whether UT's admissions
policy allowed it to provide the educational benefits of a diverse student
body to all its undergraduate students.
45
Although Fisher 11 focused on race-neutral alternatives, the Court
reaffirmed the longstanding principle that "[a] university cannot impose a
fixed quota or otherwise 'define diversity as "some specified percentage
of a particular group merely because of its race or ethnic origin.""' 46 In
concluding that UT had met its "heavy burden" of showing that it had
adequately considered race-neutral measures,47 the Court again pointed to
UT's "'months of study and deliberation"' and "good faith in conducting
its studies.48  The majority also noted demographic data showing
"consistent stagnation" in minority student enrollment at UT during a six-
year period when UT was forbidden by law to utilize race-conscious
measures.49 The Court observed that "[a]lthough demographics alone are
by no means dispositive, they do have some value as a gauge of the
University's ability to enroll students who can offer underrepresented
perspectives."5 The Court also noted that minority students "experienced
feelings of loneliness and isolation," corroborated by the low number of
minority students in many undergraduate classes.51
The Court also accepted the need for UT to consider race in
admission because such consideration "had a meaningful, if still limited,
effect on the diversity of the entering class."52 The Court recited statistics
showing that in a four-year period after UT's adoption of a race-conscious
approach for the portion of the class admitted through "holistic review",
the percentage of Hispanic and African-American students enrolled
through that process increased 54 and 94 percent, respectively.53
43. Fisher 11, 136 S. Ct. at 2210-11.
44. Id. at 2211.
45. Id. at 2205-06, 2211.
46. Id. at 2208 (citation omitted).
47. Id. at 2211.
48. Id. at 2211-12.
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The Court concluded that at the time of Fisher's application, none of
her proposed race-neutral alternatives was "workable".54 The Court
emphasized that UT had "spent seven years attempting to achieve its
compelling interest using race-neutral holistic review", but "[n]one of
th[ose] efforts succeeded."55 The majority was particularly critical of the
"Top Ten Percent Plan", a Texas law that requires UT to admit up to 75
percent of its student body based on class rank in Texas public schools.
The Court observed that "the Top Ten Percent Plan, though facially
neutral, cannot be understood apart from its basic purpose, which is to
boost minority enrollment" and that "if [college admissions] were a
function of class rank alone[, t]hat approach would sacrifice all other
aspects of diversity in pursuit of enrolling a higher number of minority
students."56 The Court reaffirmed the principle that "the Equal Protection
Clause does not force universities to choose between a diverse student
body and a reputation for academic excellence.57
Lastly, the Court stressed the need for ongoing review of race-
conscious measures. "Through regular evaluation of data and
consideration of student experience, the University must tailor its
approach in light of changing circumstances, ensuring that race plays no
greater role than is necessary to meet its compelling interest."58
B. Financial aid
Some current calls to address racial inequality on campus propose
increased financial aid for minority students, including scholarships
restricted to minority students, and free tuition for minority students.59
The Supreme Court cases relating to campus diversity have all involved
race-conscious admissions decisions.6" Although few cases involving
race-conscious financial aid have reached the courts, those courts have
invalidated race-exclusive scholarships as inconsistent with Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VI"), which prohibits discrimination on
the basis of race by recipients of federal financial assistance,6' and the
54. Id. at 2212-13.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 2213.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 2210.
59. See generally Our Demands, supra note 1.
60. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2205-07; Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013);
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Regents
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); De Funis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 316
(1974).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012) ("No person in the United States shall, on the ground
of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
[Vol. 120:4
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Equal Protection Clause.62 While the U.S. Department of Education
("Department") has noted differences between financial aid and
admissions decisions,63 it is likely that courts, the Department, and higher
education institutions will continue to extrapolate the Court's decisions on
race-conscious college admissions, including Fisher II, to race-conscious
financial aid.64
C. Special programs
Student groups also have recently demanded that colleges and
universities mount special programs for minority students, such as campus
visits for potential minority applicants and bridge programs for students of
color.65 The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the lawfulness of
such programs at colleges and universities.66 As with financial aid, courts,
financial assistance."); see Flanagan v. Georgetown Coll., 417 F. Supp. 377, 385 (D.D.C.
1976) (finding that set-aside of financial aid for minority law students violated Title VI).
62. See Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 161 (4th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (finding
race-exclusive scholarship program was unconstitutional).
63. In 1994 the Department published guidance on race-conscious scholarships
under Title VI, which generally followed the Supreme Court's then jurisprudence under
Title VI and the Equal Protection Clause. 59 Fed. Reg. 8756 (1994). The Department
observed that unlike the admissions quota disapproved in Bakke, race-exclusive financial
aid does not exclude applicants from a university on the basis of race, and the amount of
financial aid available to students is not necessarily fixed. See id. at 8759. While not ruling
out race-exclusive scholarships, the Department emphasized that they should be a last
resort. See id. at 8762. The guidance is dated, inasmuch as the law has evolved since 1994
and the importance of financial aid has increased as the price of higher education has risen.
64. Financial aid may also raise issues under Title VII if there are employment
aspects to the financial support. See Section IV.D.
65. See generally Our Demands, supra note 1.
66. In other contexts, federal appeals courts have reached differing conclusions about
minority-targeted outreach efforts. Compare MD/DC/DE Broad. Ass'n v. FCC, 236 F.3d
13, 22-23 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (applying strict scrutiny, court invalidated Federal
Communications Commission's rule requiring outreach to minority applicants by
broadcast employers as not narrowly tailored), and Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. City of White
House, 191 F.3d 675, 692 (6th Cir. 1999) ("[W]here 'outreach' requirements operate as a
sub rosa racial preference-that is, where their administration 'indisputably pressures'
contractors to hire minority subcontractors-courts must apply strict scrutiny."), and
Monterey Mech. Co. v. Wilson, 125 F.3d 702, 711 (9th Cir. 1997) (invalidating state statute
requiring "good faith" efforts by general contractors to comply with participation goals for
minority and women contractors through, among other steps, advertising and bid
invitations where program mandated "distribution of information only to members of
designated groups, without any requirement or condition that persons in other groups
receive the same information"), with Dunnet Bay Constr. Co. v. Borggren, 799 F.3d 676,
697-98 (7th Cir. 2015) (applying strict scrutiny in upholding disadvantaged business
enterprise participation goal of 20%), and N. Contracting, Inc. v. Illinois, 473 F.3d 715,
719-20 (7th Cir. 2007) (applying strict scrutiny in upholding goal of 22.77% participation
by disadvantaged business enterprises because program was "narrowly tailored to the
compelling interest identified by the federal government-remedying the effects of racial
and gender discrimination in the highway construction market"), and Allen v. Ala. State
Bd. of Educ., 164 F.3d 1347, 1352 (1 1th Cir. 1999) ("[W]here the government does not
2016]
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the Department, and colleges and universities are likely to continue to
apply principles from the Supreme Court's decisions in admissions cases
to special programs intended to foster student body diversity.
D. Employment
A focal point of recent campus unrest has been the level of faculty
diversity. Groups have called for a range of strategies to increase faculty
diversity, including demands that minority faculty equal minority
percentages in the national population or the student population or a
specified percentage of faculty.67
For public institutions covered by the Equal Protection Clause, the
Supreme Court to date has recognized only one compelling interest to
justify consideration of race in employment - remedying the effects of
prior discrimination by the public employer.68 Fisher II addressed
consideration of race only in connection with student body-not faculty-
diversity under the Equal Protection Clause.
Public as well as private employers are subject to Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment decisions "because
of' race and certain other characteristics.69 While the Court has
distinguished Title VII analysis from its Equal Protection jurisprudence,7"
Title VII, like the Equal Protection Clause, allows an employer to consider
race in employment decisions when necessary to remedy past
discrimination in employment by the employer.71 Title VII also permits
exclude persons from benefits based on race, but chooses to undertake outreach efforts to
persons of one race, broadening the pool of applicants, but disadvantaging no one, strict
scrutiny is generally inapplicable."), vacated, 216 F.3d 1263 (11 th Cir. 2000).
67. See generally Our Demands, supra note 1.
68. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 283-84 (1986) (invalidating
under Equal Protection Clause provision of public school district's collective bargaining
agreement that gave minority teachers preferential protection against layoffs).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). Courts apply the Title VII standard to cases
brought under Section 1981 alleging racial discrimination in an employment contract.
Coleman v. Blockbuster, Inc., 352 F. App'x 676, 680 (3d Cir. 2009); Takele v. Mayo
Clinic, 576 F.3d 834, 838 (8th Cir. 2009); Schurr v. Resorts Int'l Hotel, Inc., 196 F.3d 486,
498-99 (3d Cir. 1999). Title VI does not apply to the employment actions of federally
funded universities unless the purpose of the federal financial assistance relates to
employment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3 (2012); see Johnson v. Cmty. Coll. of Allegheny Cty,,
566 F. Supp. 2d 405, 457 (W.D. Pa. 2008). See generally AM. ASs'N FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF SCI. & ASS'N OF AM. UNIVS., HANDBOOK ON DIVERSITY AND THE LAW:
NAVIGATING A COMPLEX LANDSCAPE TO FOSTER GREATER FACULTY AND STUDENT
DIVERSITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION 77-126 (2010).
70. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 632 (1987) (noting that Court
does "not regard as identical the constraints of Title VII and the Federal Constitution on
voluntarily adopted affirmative action plans").
71. See, e.g., Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of San Francisco, 979 F.2d
721, 726-27 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 583-84 (2009)
(reporting that City of New Haven, in effort to combat past discrimination, improperly
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consideration of race in certain circumstances without evidence that the
employer itself engaged in discrimination. In those instances, the
employer's consideration of race as an affirmative action measure must be
necessary to eliminate a demonstrated manifest imbalance in a
traditionally segregated job group, must be temporary in nature, and must
not unnecessarily trammel the rights of others or create an absolute bar to
their advancement.72 For the purpose of eliminating such manifest
imbalance, the Supreme Court has upheld under Title VII a job
apprenticeship program that temporarily allocated a portion of slots by
race73 and a hiring decision that used gender as a flexible plus factor when
considered on a case-by-case basis along with qualifications.74 In both of
these cases, the employer examined the composition of the workforce in
relation to the relevant labor pool, and there was a long-standing pattern
of exclusion.75
discarded its firefighter examination to achieve more desirable racial distribution of
promotion-eligible candidates; there was no strong basis in evidence that examination was
deficient and that discarding it was necessary to avoid unlawful disparate impact related to
race). For Section 1981 race discrimination cases in the employment context, a valid
affirmative action plan serves as a defense, and the standard for evaluating the validity of
a plan is identical to the standard developed under Title VII decisions. See Schurr v. Resorts
Int'l Hotel, Inc., 196 F.3d 486, 498-99 (3d Cir. 1999).
72. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 630; United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208-
09 (1979).
73. See United Steelworkers, 443 U.S. at 208-09.
74. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 640-42.
75. Lower court decisions in higher education cases have generally followed the
Supreme Court's standards described above. See, e.g., Rudin v. Lincoln Land Cmty. Coll.,
420 F.3d 712, 721-22 (7th Cir. 2005) (denying college's motion for summary judgment in
Title VII case because insertion of African American male into interview pool in manner
bypassing first eliminations provided circumstantial evidence of race discrimination where
college did not argue that it engaged in affirmative action in order to remedy any past
discrimination or for some other remedial purpose and abandoned efense based on
diversity rationale); Hill v. Ross, 183 F.3d 586, 590, 592 (7th Cir. 1999) (reversing
summary judgment for university, stating that under Title VII and constitutional standards,
public university had to articulate nondiscriminatory rationale for decision to take race or
gender into account and, on remand, would need to demonstrate that it acted pursuant to
permissible affirmative action plan); Taxman v. Piscataway Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547,
1557-58 (3d Cir. 1996) (stating faculty diversity is not permissible rationale for race-
conscious employment decisions under Title VII; invalidating provision in collective
bargaining agreement that gave minority teachers preference in case of tie in layoff
decisions), cert. dismissed, 527 U.S. 1010 (1997); Honadle v. Univ. of Vt. & State Agric.
Coll., 56 F. Supp. 2d 419, 423, 429 (D. Vt. 1999) (upholding, against Title VII challenge,
voluntary affirmative action plan of public university that made incentive funds available
to departments to encourage minority hiring in order to correct manifest imbalance in job
group at issue because incentive funding "was not intended to influence hiring decisions"
and no more than $10,000 could be made available to assist in any given hire); Univ. &
Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Nevada v. Farmer, 930 P.2d 730, 737 (Nev. 1997) (upholding
university decisions under race-conscious affirmative action program to hire and offer
larger than normal salary to African American professor without conducting typical
interviews because university had remedial purpose, but also referring to "compelling
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Pursuant to Executive Order 11246 government contractors,
including higher education institutions that hold government contracts, are
required to develop affirmative action plans to address underutilization of
minorities in various job categories.76 Executive Order 11246 requires
government contractors to set placement goals for hiring and promotion
based on a statistical analysis of underrepresentation of minorities in the
job group relative to the qualified labor pool.77 While the contractor must
use good faith efforts toward meeting goals, the Executive Order does not
require or permit use of racial preferences in selection decisions to achieve
those goals.78
E. Procurement
Recent calls for racial equality on campus have not highlighted
procurement decisions. In a longstanding set of cases the Supreme Court
has held that federal and state governments may award contracts to
minority-owned businesses on a preferential basis in order to overcome
the present effects of proven past discrimination only if the government
has a "strong basis in evidence" to conclude that "remedial action is
necessary."79 Fisher II addresses race-conscious efforts to foster diversity,
not to overcome past discrimination, and does not affect the law on
minority contracting.
F. Public and Private Higher Education Institutions
While all of the Supreme Court cases to date challenging race-
conscious initiatives at universities have involved public institutions
subject to the Equal Protection Clause,"0 a number of those cases have also
interest in fostering culturally and ethnically diverse faculty"), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1004
(1998).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e note (referencing Exec. Order No. 11, 246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,
319 (Sept. 24, 1965), as amended by Exec. Order No. 11,375, 32 Fed. Reg. 14,303 (Oct.
13, 1967)).
77. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (Sept. 24, 1965), as amended by
13,672, 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.16 (July 24, 2014).
78. Exec. Order 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (Sep. 24, 1965); Exec. Order No.
13,672, 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.16(e)(2) (July 24, 2014) ("Placement goals do not provide the
contractor with a justification to extend a preference to any individual, select an individual,
or adversely affect an individual's employment status, on the basis of that person's race,
color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, or national origin.").
79. Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 222 (1995) (quoting Richmond v.
J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989)).
80. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex.
at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (same); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003)
(University of Michigan); Grutter v. Bollinger, 529 U.S. 306 (2003) (same); Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (University of California at Davis); DeFunis
v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (University of Washington).
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involved claims under Title VI, which applies to both public and private
recipients of federal financial assistance, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("Section
1981"), which prohibits racial discrimination in contracting, including
private school admissions decisions." In Bakke a majority of the Court
concluded that Title VI "proscribe[s] only those racial classifications that
would violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth Amendment.'8 2 In
a summary manner in Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger, the
Court also equated Section 1981 with the Equal Protection Clause.83 The
Court has not squarely faced the question whether Title VI and Section
1981 might apply differently in the context of a private institution, thereby
giving a private institution more flexibility to adopt race-conscious
measures.84 The Court's decision in Fisher I focused only on the Equal
Protection Clause, but will be welcomed by colleges and universities as
they address their obligations under Title VI and Section 1981 as well.
G. State law
Notwithstanding the permissibility of narrowly tailored race-
conscious efforts to achieve student body (and possibly faculty) diversity
under federal law, eight states-Arizona, California, Florida, Michigan,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, and Washington-have restricted
use of racial preferences by public universities and other state agencies.85
In 2014 the Supreme Court upheld Michigan's constitutional
amendment, thereby allowing states to prohibit use of race-based
preferences in admissions by public higher education institutions.86 The
Court continued to allow higher education institutions to utilize race-
81. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2012) ("All persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts, ... and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens ...."); see Runyon v. McCrary,
427 U.S. 160, 172 (1976) (contract for educational services is "contract" for purposes of
Section 1981).
82. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 287; accord id. at 328 (Brennan, J., concurring in part &
dissenting in part); see Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275-76.
83. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275-76; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
84. See, e.g., Doe v. Kamehameha Schs./Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate, 470 F.3d
827, 839 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (distinguishing Grutter and Gratz and upholding, against
challenge under Section 1981, admissions preference for Native Hawaiians by independent
school that received no federal funds); Brief of Brown Univ., et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 3, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. 14-981 (U.S. filed Nov.
2, 2015).
85. See ARiz. CONST. art. II, § 36; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a); MICH. CONST. art. I, §
26(1); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 30; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 36A; N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 188-
F:3-a (2012); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.400 (West 2013); Fla. Exec. Order No. 99-
281 (Nov, 9, 1999).
86. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1637 (2014)
(plurality opinion).
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conscious admissions policies to the extent permitted by federal and
relevant state law.87
As institutions in states with restrictions on use of race pursue
diversity through race-neutral means, their experience may be helpful to
institutions in other states considering whether various race-neutral
alternatives are "workable" and entail "tolerable administrative
expense."88 The Court's decision in Fisher II does not affect the
constitutionality of such state laws.
V. CONCLUSION
At oral argument in Fisher 1I UT's counsel concluded with an appeal
that "now is not the time and this is not the case to roll back student body
diversity in America."89 The Court appears to have heeded that call. At
the end of its opinion in Fisher II, the Court again recognized the
compelling interest in student body diversity:
A university is in large part defined by those intangible qualities which
are incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness.
Considerable deference is owed to a university in defining those
intangible characteristics, like student body diversity, that are central
to its identity and educational mission.
9
0
But the Court also tied that compelling interest o the need for
ongoing review of race-conscious measures:
The University now has at its disposal valuable data about he manner
in which different approaches to admissions may foster diversity or
instead dilute it. The University must continue to use this data to
scrutinize the fairness of its admissions program; to assess whether
changing demographics have undermined the need for a race-
conscious policy; and to identify the effects, both positive and
negative, of the affirmative-action measures it deems necessary.
The Court's affirmance of the University's admissions policy today
does not necessarily mean the University may rely on that same policy
without refinement. It is the University's ongoing obligation to engage
87. Id. at 1630.
88. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2013); see, e.g., Lorelle
Espinoza et al., Race, Class, & College Access: Achieving Diversity in a Shifting Legal
Landscape, AM. COUNCIL ON EDUC. (July 21, 2015), http://www.acenet.edu/news-
room/Pages/Race-Class-and-College-Access-Achieving-Diversity-in-a-Shifting-Legal-
Landscape.aspx; RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, CENTURY FOUND., ACHIEVING BETTER
DivERSITY: REFORMING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN HIGHER EDUCATION (Dec. 3, 2015),
http://www.tcf.org/assets/downloads/AchievingBetterDiversity.pdf.
89. Oral Arg. Tr. 68, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. 14-981 (Dec. 9, 2015),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oralarguments/argument-transcripts/14-981 _onjq.pdf.
90. Fisher 11, 136 S. Ct. at 2214-15 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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in constant deliberation and continued reflection regarding its
admissions policies.
91
The Court's decision in Fisher II confirms the lawfulness of the types
of holistic, race-conscious admissions policies that many higher education
institutions have utilized for many years, but repeatedly reminds
institutions of the need for ongoing assessment of such policies. That
principle is likely to apply not only in the context of race-conscious
admissions, but in other types of race-conscious initiatives, existing and
proposed. All campus constituencies should be mindful of that principle
as colleges and universities address calls for measures to ameliorate racial
inequality on campus and in the nation at large.
91. Id.
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